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ABSTRACT
The objective of this thesis is to identify key factors that will produce further growth
for NTT DoCoMo in Japan's mature mobile market.
Since the early 1990s, the mobile phone market in Japan has grown rapidly, and
competition for additional market share resulted in technological innovations like NTT
DoCoMo's i-mode service to mobile carriers. Until recently, those innovations had
leveraged the growth of the mobile phone industry. However, in 2004 the number of mobile
phone subscribers exceeded 85 million and penetration rate reached 66.6%. Under such
circumstances, the growth of the mobile carriers is gradually slowing. Moreover, there are
threats which have the potential to change the current business model: mobile number
portability, flat rate, new entrants, and globalization.
In this thesis, I develop and organize frameworks that can be used by a company to
produce further growth in a mature market by using traditional growth models. Then I
analyze the sources for growth in mobile market and how the threats affect current dynamics
in the mobile market. Finally I examine how the frameworks can work for NTT DoCoMo,
and discuss the keys for growth in Japan's mature mobile market.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 THESIS OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to identify key factors that will produce further growth
for NTT DoCoMo in Japan's mature mobile market.
Since the early 1990s, the mobile market in Japan has grown rapidly. Competition for
getting market share resulted in technological innovations like NTT DoCoMo's i-mode
service to mobile operators. Until recently, those innovations had leveraged the growth of the
mobile industry. However, in 2004 the number of mobile phone subscribers exceeded 85
million and penetration rate reached 66.6%. Under such circumstances, the growth of mobile
operators is gradually slowing. Recently, NTT DoCoMo announced that its sales and profit
in 2004 would decrease compared to 2003-the first time this has happened since NTT
DoCoMo was founded (Table 1-1, Fig. l-l1).
Table 1-1 Financial data, FY 2003 to FY 2005, NTT DoCoMo
2003 2004 2005 (Forecast as
(in X, billion) of Oct. 29, 2004)
Operating Revenue 4,809.1 5,048.1 4,820
(+4.97%) (-4.52%)
Operation Income 1,056.7 1,102.9 830
(+4.37%) (-24.74%)
EBITDA 1,836.3 1,858.9 1,611
(+1.23%) (-13.34%)
Source: NTT DoCoMo IR presentations, 2004
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Fig. 1-1 Growth rate in number of subscribers in Japanese mobile market
Moreover, there are several threats that may change the structure of the market. The
first threat is mobile number portability (MNP), a feature that enables subscribers to change
their mobile carrier without giving up their current telephone number. According to reports
from countries that have already introduced MNP, competition based on services and price
has become much more intense.
Another threat is new entrants into the mobile market. Although there have been
many M&As in the last decade, NTT DoCoMo's market share has remained stable. In 2004,
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) announced that it was
considering providing new band-width spectrum for newcomers, which will encourage
newcomers to provide their services at much lower prices than incumbents in the market.
Globalization is another threat. Until now, Japanese mobile operators have provided
their services only in Japan using standard Japanese technology and equipment that was
developed with Japanese vendors specifically for providing their services. In contrast, foreign
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mobile operators purchase equipment from international vendors such as Nokia and Ericsson.
In 2001 third-generation (3G) mobile phone service was launched in Japan. Because it was
standardized by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) it enabled foreign
equipment vendors to enter the Japanese mobile phone market-and vice versa. That will
undoubtedly have some effect on the current value chain.
1.2 THESIS STRUCTURE
There will be seven chapters in this thesis, beginning with Chapter 1 which provides
an introduction to help the reader understand the objective and structure of the thesis. Figure
1-2 provides a visual framework of the thesis structure.
In Chapter 2 I examine, in a general way, how companies grow. The research
provides an overview of the literature on the topics of growth and innovation, including the
necessity of growth, the processes of growth, the characteristics of a mature market, and
difficulties of maintaining continuous growth. In Chapter 3, I offer some solutions for further
growth. These are derived from cases about growing companies. I investigate processes,
requirements, and risks for each solution. Three growth patterns are examined: a new market
innovation that leverages the core business, platform leadership and concentrated investing in
a prospective business.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I identify factors affecting the mobile market by applying the
frameworks. In Chapter 4, I investigate trends in the world mobile market. These trends
include technologies, penetration rate, handsets, and alliances. I also describe the process
involved in introducing the third-generation (3G) mobile service.
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In Chapter 5, I analyze the structure of the mobile industry in Japan, using Michael
Porter's Five Forces Model to determine if the industry is currently profitable. I also use a
system dynamic model to help understand the important factors in the industry. Finally, the
strategies of mobile carriers in Japan and the threats to the mobile industry in Japan are
shown as factors that will affect the frameworks.
In Chapter 6, I take the frameworks from Chapter 3, add the factors discussed in
Chapters 4 and 5, and show how this model can be adapted to formulate NTT DoCoMo's
future strategy.
In Chapter 7, I conclude the thesis and identify keys for growth in Japan's mature
mobile market.
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Chapter 2
The Problems of Growth
In this chapter I describe the necessity of growth for a company. I analyze patterns of
growth and potential difficulties. From there I can define the characteristics of a mature
market.
2.1 WHY IS CONTINUOUS GROWTH NECESSARY?
Although most people assume that growth is necessary for a company, I would like to
define that necessity as a starting point. I find there are three perspectives from which growth
can be viewed: shareholders, employees, and society.
2.1.1 Shareholders
For potential investors, the growth of a company is a signal to invest into the
company. If further growth is not forthcoming or expected, investors will not want to invest
in the company
For shareholders, a company's growth signals that the company is likely to be
prospering and that they have made a good investment by purchasing shares in the company.
Shareholders are likely to sell their stock if they perceive that the company is not progressing
11
satisfactorily, or that it has become stagnant, or that growth has stopped. As a result, the price
of a company's stock goes up and down reflecting those perceptions.
The problem is that growth rate forecasts by analysts affect shareholders' reactions.
When the growth rate does not exceed the value that analysts have forecasted, stockholder
reaction tends to be negative. Even if the growth rate maintains the previous year's rate, there
may be skepticism about growth potential.
2.1.2 Employees
Growth rate affects employees' motivation. If growth rate is flat or negative,
employees tend to become conservative and try to maintain their current positions. Often this
results in an organization becoming bureaucratic unless management recognizes the trend
and makes improvements.
On the other hand, a positive growth rate tends to encourage good employees to
remain with the company.
These reasons create a positive feedback loop.
2.1.3 Society
From society's point of view, a positive growth rate in large companies is a sign that
business is improving, which in turns generally motivates consumers to purchase more goods.
An increased purchase rate imparts a positive image to society and makes it easier to recruit
talented employees. This also creates a positive feedback loop.
A system dynamics model, which includes the factors mentioned so far, is shown in
Figure 2-1.
12
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Fig. 2-1 Relationship between growth rate and stock price
2.2 THE PROCESS OF GROWTH
In this section, I will explain how a company grows by using S-curve and innovation
patterns.
2.2.1 S-curve
Generally speaking, an S-curve is used to explain the life cycle of a product's
performance.
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As shown in Figure 2-2, an S-curve includes four stages: Early, Take off, Growth,
and Plateau.
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Fig. 2-2 S-curve
In the Early stage, product performance is poor with many failures, but the product
has unique characteristics that capture innovative users.
In the Take-offstage, feedback from users and competition between companies tends
to strengthen the product's performance.
In the Growth stage, large companies that successfully exploit economies of scale
and mass production will dominate the industry.
However, in the Plateau stage, the growth curve of product performance becomes flat
because growth has reached a physical limit or saturation point.
An S-curve like the one above shows not only the life cycle of a product but also the
growth of a company (see Fig. 2-3). In the plateau stage the company has to compete with
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followers either by price or economies of scale. If the company remains in that situation, it
will move into the decline stage. Therefore every company must avoid staying for any length
of time in the plateau stage.
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Fig. 2-3 S curve for company's growth
2.2.2 Incremental Innovation and Disruptive Innovation
To avoid entering the plateau stage, a company typically makes every effort to
develop innovations. Innovation can be classified into two types: incremental innovation and
disruptive innovation.
Incremental innovation occurs in an S-curve in the form of development or
improvement of a product or service in the early stage. Products or services on the same S-
curve are based on the same architecture. Improvement of a product's performance by
incremental innovation slows down at the plateau stage because of the product's physical
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limitations. Companies that lead markets have to prepare for the plateau stage by replacing
current technology with new technology for the markets. However, continuous incremental
innovation causes performance to overshoot customer demand. When this occurs, customers
are not willing to pay for the performance.
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Fig. 2-4 Incremental innovation
In contrast, disruptive innovation occurs between the current S-curve and a new S-
curve in another market. The new S-curve is based on a different concept than the old S-
curve (see Fig. 2-5). Generally speaking, the new concept aims to provide cheaper, more
useful products or services to improve on or replace old products or services that are
currently in the plateau stage. Market share will swing dramatically when the performance of
the new product or service positively or negatively impacts the old one. At that time required
performance also is changed by the disruptive innovation.
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Fig. 2-5 Disruptive innovation
2.3 WHY IS CONTINUOUS GROWTH SO DIFFICULT?
In this section I discuss challenges that make continuous growth difficult to maintain.
2.3.1 Exponential Growth Needed
This challenge is a simple math problem. If a company is focused on showing an
upward growth rate rather than highlighting stable value, the company will have to
continually grow its business exponentially.
The formula to calculate the growth rate of revenue in year t is shown as follows:
Gt = (Rt - R(t- )) / R(t - )
where:
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Market B
Gt Growth rate in year t,
Rt: Revenue in year t
Therefore, Revenue in year t can be calculated by using the following formula:
Rt = Gt*R(t -1) + R(t - )
The formula can be changed by using revenue in t-2 year:
Rt = Gt * (G(t - 1) * R(t - 2)+ R(t - 2)) + G(t - 1) * R(t - 2)+ R(t - 2)
Assuming growth is stable, the formula can be changed:
Rt = G2 * R(t - 2) + 2G * R(t- 2) + R(t - 2)
Finally, by using revenue in t-x year, the formula can be represented as follows:
x-l
Rt = Gx * R(tx) + x (G(-i) *R(,_t,) + R(tX,
i=l
As this formula shows, the revenue a company must earn grows exponentially from year to
year under a constant growth rate. I have illustrated this revenue growth under constant
growth rate in Figure 2-6.
As an example, NTT DoCoMo must earn more than Y250 billion as operating revenue
in 2005 in order to maintain the same growth rate as in the previous year. That number is
almost equal to the operating revenue of Tu-Ka Cellular in 2005, the fourth largest mobile
carrier in Japan.
18
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 2-6 Revenue under a constant growth rate
2.3.2 How do Large Companies Perform to Achieve Further Growth?
Typical behaviors of large companies that lead their markets are described by
Christensen (1997) as a series of steps.
Step 1: A disruptive product is created as a prototype in the established company.
Step 2: Management decided there is declining demand for the current product based on
market research with current users.
Step 3: The established company concentrates on developing an incremental innovative
product that will create a larger profit margin with current users.
Step 4: A new company is founded by engineers who worked for the established company;
they identify a new market for the product in a niche or low-end category.
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Step 5: The new company expands its target to the upper-end category where the established
company is already selling its current product.
Step 6: The established company changes its strategy and develops products based on the
new architecture.
The reasons for this behavior is explained by the concept of "value network." The
value network has a structure of nested boxes that consist of manufacturers and markets. The
companies in the value network have characteristics that are adequate for the value network,
and they tend to make much of customers in the value network. Therefore established
companies tend to fail to follow disruptive innovation although they carefully manage their
organization so as to move it toward further growth.
2.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF A MATURE MARKET
In this section I define the characteristics of a mature market.
2.4.1 The Target is "Late Majority and Laggard" Consumers
Moore (1999) divided consumers into five categories: Innovators, Early Adapters,
Early Majority, Late Majority, and Laggards. These consumers show up in the market
according to their perception of the product's performance, as shown by the S-curve in
Figure 2-7.
20
I~~~~~~~i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Innovators Early Early Majority Late Majority Laggards
Adopters 
I I
stageI I
o0-
a
o 
o
CDI
_1
Early stage
Time
Source: Moore, 2002
Fig. 2-7 Technology adoption life cycle and S curve
Innovators are consumers who are keenly interested in new technology. They buy a
new product as soon as it appears for sale in a market. Although early adopters are not as
enthusiastic about technology as are innovators, early adopters are familiar with new
technologies and typically find it easy to understand the benefits of a new product. If they
identify benefits they like, they will buy the new product very early in its life cycle. The
early majority and the late majority comprise the majority of a market. These two categories
of consumers are more practical than early adopters. Moreover, the late majority tend to wait
and observe a product's performance until it becomes generally accepted as a standard in the
market. Laggards are consumers who just do not like new technology or the new product that
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incorporates a new technology. It is very difficult to convince them to purchase the new
product.
In a mature market, the main target is the late majority and laggard consumers.
Enormous amounts of money are spent on market research to determine how to persuade the
late majority and laggards to purchase a new product. Thus the market is fully segmented by
preference.
2.4.2 Products Become Commodities
Utterback (1994) defined "dominant design" as a product design that has been
approved during its growth stage by the majority of the consuming public. After a dominant
design is established in the market, other companies begin to imitate it. Thus competition
between companies shifts from differentiation of product to cost and scale. In the plateau
stage, products have similar functions and it is hard to determine which is most adequate for
users.
2.4.3 Price Wars
In a mature market, it is difficult to make companies to make a profit because the
products become commoditized, which frequently results in a price wars to move the product
in the market.
After the growth stage, companies begin to pursue economies of scale as a way to
decrease production costs. As a result, production capability increases beyond the capacity of
the market. Price discounting is a typical strategy adopted by companies in order to compete
with other companies. However, that price discounting gives customers greatly increased
22
purchasing power; they tend to buy until items go on sale before purchasing. Moreover,
many companies find they must now discount the price in response to their competitor's
price. That creates a negative feedback loop that exhausts both companies. The so-called
"winner" of a price war usually ends up losing both growth and profit.
2.5 SUMMARY
Continuous growth is necessary for firms because it causes positive feedback, not
only for stakeholders-both shareholders and employees-but also for society. However, it
is difficult for a company to continue growing beyond its S-curve.
Challenges arise in the form of the company's size, its desire to retain current
customers, and to fend off invasion by newcomers to the market.
In a mature market, products become commoditized, which companies to pursue
economies of scale. As a result, surplus products are produced which exceed the capacity of
the market, which in turn gives consumers power and causes price war between companies.
Eventually it becomes difficult for the company to grow and it is unable to move out of the
plateau stage.
23
Chapter 3
Solutions for Achieving Further Growth
In this chapter, I present solutions for achieving additional growth that have worked
well in the real world. I have identified three solutions by which companies have succeeded
in growing in a mature market:
1) A new market innovation that leverages the core business
2) Platform leadership
3) Concentrated investing in a prospective business
For each solution, I give a brief description along with a concept model in which I use circles
to represent the size and kind of markets, and an S-curve to represent the degree of maturity
of the markets. Then I analyze the requirements needed to apply the solution.
3.1 A NEW MARKET INNOVATION THAT LEVERAGES THE CORE
BUSINESS
"Innovation" is an attractive word for companies in a mature market. Ideally, the new
market created by a disruptive innovation will leverage the company's mature core business,
as shown in Figure 3-1.
Apple is an excellent example. Although Apple was losing in its competition with
Wintel, Apple created an innovative on-line music distribution market. There was already an
24
on-line music store, but then Apple developed its highly popular iPod. The product's design
and the reasonable prices for music attracted millions of consumers. Apple established its
iPod brand and produced variations for each segment of the market.
Apple is a company that believes that ongoing investment in research and
development is critical to producing innovative new and improved products and technologies.
In addition to updates to its existing line of personal computers and related software, services,
and peripherals, the company continues to capitalize on the convergence of digital consumer
electronics and the computer by creating product innovations like iPod and the iTunes Music
Store.
Disr
inno.
-age
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 3-1 New market leverages core business
However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, a disruptive innovation may be created by small
or startup companies rather than established companies because the established company
wishes to protect its current level of profit. It is not easy to do that systematically. For
example, although the R&D division of Pfizer develops thousands of ideas for new
medicines, only one idea typically gets through the funnel (Wheelright and Clark, 1992) and
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into commercialization. That commercialization process takes about fifteen years on average
and requires a huge supporting R&D budget. On the other hand, some established companies
like 3M, Pfizer, and DuPont, are taking steps to create innovations systematically. By
referring to those companies' structures, I have illustrated the structure of an innovative
company in Figure 3-2.
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Fig. 3-2 Structure of an innovative organization
The factors in Figure 3-2 are explained below.
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Sources for new ideas
I have identified six factors that could be considered sources for new ideas: hidden
assets, feedback from failures, research by other industries, monitoring market newcomers,
market research, and learning from users.
Slywotzky and Wise (2003) noted that hidden assets are an important factor for
helping established companies create a new market. Hidden assets are different from
intangible assets and generally include brand, intellectual properties, number of customers,
loyal user communities, partnerships, and relationship with customers. These assets have
been established for a long time, and they are difficult for newcomers to imitate. On the other
hand, established companies have built hidden liabilities that need to be understood including
its corporate culture, organization, brand image, and relationships with suppliers or
customers.
Feedback from failure is an important source of innovation. An established company
in particular often has a number of failed projects in its history. If someone fails with an
innovative project, management should not punish that person. Reserving the experience for
possible background or foundation of a new innovation in the future is important, so
management must take the time to analyze why a certain innovation failed.
Research conducted by other industries helps innovators determine if their own
technology or process might work in the industry. Sometimes that causes companies to
expand their business area or to enter into a partnership with other companies.
Incumbents have to defend their market against newcomers that have a disruptive
innovation. Therefore monitoring of market newcomers has to be done regularly so
established companies can protect their market.
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Although market research is a traditional method for determining user needs, von
Hippel (1998) suggests that learning from lead users who know what they really need is
actually another method of developing an innovation. This is especially obvious in the
software industry. Finding lead users and associating with user communities are key factors.
Inside Company
By taking advantage of the sources mentioned above, I have identified three sectors
within a company that could devise ideas for new innovations:
1. In-house laboratories, in which a company invests to create innovative
technologies.
2. A business section that is eager to increase its profit via a new business.
3. Other employees in the company who have identified what they really need as
users or are close to their customers.
Outside Company
Most companies use internal resources to create innovation. However, there is a limit
to how much the company can rely on those resources. To increase the possibility of
developing a successful innovation, a company should consider using outside resources.
The most common outside resources is universities and academia in general, which
already have many established laboratories that are developing innovations. Venture
companies often have innovative technologies and emerging markets, which may be potential
external resources. Another resource is established companies that are role-playing as
complementor for a current business, and may be able to suggest new ideas and
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collaborations. The company needs to maintain contact with the outside companies so as not
to miss valuable ideas.
The real challenge lies in how to obtain those resources. The company can choose
among alliances, joint ventures, M&As, or investment. Each option has advantages and
disadvantages, and the company will have to choose which path work best according to the
company's strategies for the future.
Selection
Selecting ideas is hard work. A good idea should be chosen based not only market
size (calculated by market research) but also on intuition which can be uncertain. If the idea
is totally new and there no market has been established, it is difficult to predict the exact
market size. However risk-taking is often necessary in order not to lose a profitable
innovation.
> Going to Market
Once an idea is chosen for commercialization, a project team must be organized. The
number of members on the team should be small, and excellent people chosen from
throughout the company. Help from departments in the core business is a prerequisite in
order to successfully launch a new business. If the project team is under the direct control of
the CEO, it can reduce potential obstacles from inside the company. Moreover, strict budget
management and improvements added via try-and-error are important.
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Decision
In some circumstances a project should be evaluated, and management will have to
decide whether or not to continue a project. The factors that measure the performance of the
project include: current financial status, possibilities, and difficulty to grow.
One example is Cusumano's eight points for a successful startup, that results in
Strategy, Technology, Product and Potential for large investor payoff. These include:
* Strong management team,
* Attractive market,
* "Compelling" new product or service,
* Strong evidence of customer interest,
* Plan to overcome the "credibility gap",
* Business model - early profits,
* Scalability, and
* Flexibility.
Once the plan is approved by management, the project team can be expanded into a
prospective business. But just as often, plans are cancelled at this stage. Even so feedback
from those plans is important as a resource for possible new ideas in the future.
Evaluation and compensation
For promote and induce innovations from people inside the company, evaluation and
compensation system are very important. For example, 3M has its so-called "15%" rule in
which employees can dedicate up to 15% of their work time to innovative activities. In
addition, the company has put in place a unique compensation system to further motivate
employee to develop innovative ideas.
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Management
In an innovative company, management needs to be in control of the entire system so
they are aware of how well the system is performing. This is especially important in the case
of major investment in a new business and/or protecting a new business. On the other hand,
management has to preserve a balance between the current core business and any new
business.
3.2 PLATFORM LEADERSHIP
The concept of platform leadership (see Figure 3-3) was devised by Gawer and
Cusumano (2002). A company that establishes a crucial interface between its complementors
can grow continuously by controlling the growth of the whole industry. The interface can be
both open and closed, depending on the company's strategy. Another important strategy is
retaining control of the company's core competence so it is not imitated by competitors. For
example, Intel developed microprocessors for personal computers and realizes profit by
maintaining its platform leadership position in the personal computer industry. By itself, a
microprocessor can do nothing for customers. Generally a personal computer consists of
various hardware and software components, including a monitor, keyboard, storage devices,
memory chip, operating system, applications for business or home and so on and Intel does
not develop these products itself. Therefore even if Intel develops another innovative new
microprocessor with added new functions, such as for example PCI, AGP and USB, it is not
clear that other manufacturers will develop new products for the new functions. If there are
no products for the new functions, the performance of personal computers is limited to the
older products. Therefore, Intel collaborates with its complementors, such as Microsoft and
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parts manufacturers, to create innovation that will have an impact on the entire industry,
reflecting the innovation of its microprocessors as a platform leader.
Complementor
----. Interface ------
Plattorm Leader
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 3-3 Platform leadership
The concept includes four levers that allow platform leaders to design and test the
validity of their strategies:
1) Scope of the firm
This lever deals with the company internal actions as well as what it encourages
others to do externally. Developing its own complementary relationships helps to ensure the
success of the company's current and future platforms.
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2) Product Technology (architecture, interfaces and intellectual property).
This lever deals with decisions regarding the degree of modularity of architectures
and the degree of openness of the interfaces. "Open but not open" technology protects the
platform leader..
3) Relationships with external complementors
This lever determines the nature of relationships between the platform leader and its
complementors, that is, how collaborative versus how competitive the relationship will be. If
the platform leader decides to enter complementary markets directly, the leader must take
care about how to achieve consensus with its partners.
4) Internal organization
This lever allows platform leaders to use their internal organization structure to
manage external and internal conflicts of interest more effectively. Options include keeping
groups with similar goals under one executive or separating groups into distinct departments
in order to address potentially conflicting goals with outside constituencies.
NTT DoCoMo and its i-mode technology is also a platform leader in the telecom
industry. I will discuss NTT DoCoMo's current strategies for its i-mode platform in Chapter
6.
3.3 CONCENTRATED INVESTING IN A PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS
Concentrated investing into a prospective business is the most straightforward
strategy for companies because they can exploit assets already in hand which allows their
products to boost incremental innovations that may be in the takeoff stage (see Figure 3-4).
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However, such action requires a brave decision for the CEO to reduce or withdraw from the
other businesses even if those are their core businesses.
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Time
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 3-4 Shift of core business
In 1988, Sharp, the world's largest LCD TV manufacturer (Display Search, 2005)
declared it would concentrate on the development of LCD television. At the time it was not
clear whether LCD TV will bring further growth to the company not. However, Katsuhiko
Machida, CEO of Sharp, decided to take the step based on the company's policy: "Only one
rather than number one." As a result, Sharp gained a huge advantage over its competitors.
In contrast, SONY had trouble with its core electronics business and was unable to
shift from PCs to flat TV. This caused the company's profits to decline dramatically,
resulting in the so-called "SONY shock" when Sony shares plunged to a seven-year low.
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3.4 OTHER SOLUTIONS
In addition to the three solutions described above, I found examples of other
strategies taken by established companies. Although I have not analyzed those strategies in
this thesis, I will describe them briefly. In addition, I have not described the cost reductions
that have been achieved by improvement of production or logistics processes and raised
prices in this thesis.
3.4.1 Geographic expansion
Geographic expansion is a strategy which not only results in an expansion of the
firm's market but also an improvement of its supply chains. Numerous multinational
corporations (MNCs) have been established since the 1970s. The strategy of many of those
companies has been to shift from exporting to manufacturing abroad. Toyota and GE are
typical examples of MNCs. Each is eager to expand their markets and reduce production
costs.
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 3-5 Geographical expansion
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3.4.2 Mergers and Acquisitions
Since the late 1990s mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have been a frequently used
strategy for survival in a mature market (see Figure 3-6). There are usually three main
reasons why a company enters into an M&A:
1. to enter a new line of business with low risk;
2. to expand the company's core business; or
3. to complement the company's existing business.
Johnson & Johnson has completed more than ten M&As in order to expand and
diversify its business. As a result, its sales have increased every year for 72 consecutive years,
and the company has enjoyed double-digit earnings increases for twenty consecutive years.
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 3-6 M&A
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3.4.3 Brand Extension
If a company has a famous brand, extending that brand is an attractive strategy (see
Figure 3-7). A company that has grown rapidly in an emerging market will try to successfully
duplicate that business model into other kinds of market. That invasion into a mature market
usually produces a disturbance among the incumbents. As a result, companies try to establish
their brand in an entire market. Virgin began in the 1970s with a student magazine and small
mail order record company. For example, Virgin Group is involved in airplanes, trains,
finance, soft drinks, music, mobile phones, vacation travel, cars, wines, publishing, and
bridal wear. The company has created over 200 companies worldwide, employing over
25,000 people.
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Fig. 3-7 Brand extension
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3.5 SUMMARY
In this chapter I described three growth patterns that are apparent in mature markets.
Those are innovation of a new market that leverages the company's core business, platform
leadership, and concentrated investing into a prospective business.
For innovations in a new market that leverage the core business, the structure of the
company is important. In addition, compensation systems and management itself play key
roles in the structure.
Regarding platform leadership, developing and maintaining a balance between open
and closed relationships, and management of conflict with complementors are important
factors.
Concentrated investing needs foresight and the ability to make a courageous decision,
but it also includes the risk of losing current market position.
Although these solutions can work at individual firms, innovative corporate structure
should be the starting point as shown in Figure 3-8. From that point, platform leadership or
concentrated investing are chosen as growth strategies.
Platform
Leadership
Expansion
nnovative >
structure Concentration nto
prospective market
Innovation strategy
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 3-8 Relationship between three solutions
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Chapter 4
Trends in the Mobile Communications Market
In this chapter, I provide background for the current mobile market by showing
trends in the mobile industry during the 1990s and into the twenty-first century.
4.1 TECHNICAL TRENDS
In 2004, the world's mobile operators began to shift their services from second-
generation mobile phone service (2G) to third-generation (3G) service around the world. The
3G mobile phone service enables customers to use new services like high-speed mobile
Internet service and video phone calling.
In 2000, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) recommended the IMT-
2000 standard for 3G mobile phone services. That includes high-quality voice transmission,
high-speed data transmission. Under the IMT-2000 standard, some technical standard groups
were created. The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) made the W-CDMA
technical standard based on GSM technology which is used in Europe and Asia. On the other
hand, 3GPP2 led by Qualcomm, has established another standard named CDMA2000 based
on CDMA technology.
These two new standards have already been used for 3G mobile phone service in the
world. The other three technical standards are TD-SCDMA supported by China, UWC-136
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based on U.S. TDMA technology, and DECT based on a standard for cordless telephony in
Europe.
IMT-2000 Terrestrial
Radio Interfaces
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Source: ITU, 2005
Fig. 4-1 IMT-2000 radio access standards
After standardization of 3G, each technical standard group expanded their standards
for higher-speed data transmission. CDMA2000 is changing from CDMA2000 1X (up to
144Kbit/sec) to CDMA EV-DO (up to 2.4Mbit/sec). W-CDMA standardized HSDPA (High
Speed Downlink Packet Access) (up to 14Mbit/sec).
Moreover, 4G, which runs at more than 1 OOMbit/sec data transmission speed and uses
the spectrum more efficiently, is discussed in ITU. The concept of 4G, which is sometimes
called "systems beyond IMT-2000," generally includes the following factors:.
The system is expected to commercialize around 2010 and broadly penetrate around
2015.
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· The system realizes transmission speed up to 100Mbit/sec for mobile usage, up to
1Gbit/sec for half fixed usage.
· The system complements multiple kinds of radio access standards seamlessly.
· The system has an "all IP" network that can handle networks more effectively.
Although at this time, it is not certain what services the 4G system will provide for
customers, NTT DoCoMo is leading research into 4G technologies including radio access
technologies, core network technologies, and human machine interface for 4G handsets.
4.2 PENETRATION RATE
Since the late 1990s, the mobile industry has grown rapidly. In China, the number of
subscribers was 269 million in 2003 and grew to 335 million in 2004. The second-largest
market is the U.S., followed by Japan (see Table 4-1).
Table 4-1 Top 10 countries by number of mobile phone subscribers
S 4bsribe ::rs::1 Penetration rate Population
Rank Country.: :- : (%) (lOOOs)
.. { : ?:i;:.i 7(%) (1000s)
1 China 00 21.4 1,257,009
2 United States 5:8722 54.3 292,306
3 Japan 86 : : 659 67.96 127,514
4 Germany : : 78.54 82,506
5 Italy 9 101.76 54,951
6 United Kingdom 49 677 84.07 59,090
7 Brazil 34673 26.36 175,923
8 France 41,s83 69.59 59,898
9 Spain 37507 91.61 40,942
10 Korea 33,592 69.37 48,424
Source: ITU, 2004
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Thus countries with a low penetration rate and large population are excellent prospective
markets for the mobile phone industry, although other factors-the gap between rich and
poor, topography, economic growth, and culture-must also be considered.
However, as Table 4-2 shows, China, the U.S., and Japan rank low in penetration rate
because of their large populations. In fact, some countries' penetration rate for mobile phones
exceeds 100%/o. Others, such as Taiwan, have grown at extraordinarily high rate in the past
five years. Therefore, Japan appears to have room for further growth compared to other high
penetration countries. It must be noted, too, that the extremely high penetration rates come
mainly from an increase in the number of prepaid subscribers. Prepaid service has no
monthly charge and additional charges are paid by prepaid card. Although the cost per
minute is relatively high, customers are attracted to this form of mobile phone use because it
ease to buy and it uses simple, uncomplicated rate plans. Therefore customers in those
countries have multiple mobile phones or SIM cards and use them in a variety of ways.
However, prepaid service is a double-edged sword for mobile operators because the
service does not produce much money from subscribers and the relative anonymity of such
service makes it easier to use in criminal activities. Most mobile operators are taking steps to
decrease the percentage of prepaid service use among their subscribers.
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Table 4-2 Mobile phone penetration rate by country
Rank Country 1998 2003 CAGR* Penetration Prepaid Population
(100Ranks) (1000s) 1998- 03 rate 2003 (%)(%) (1000s)
1 Taiwan 4,727 25,090 39.6 110.84 20-30 22,636
2 Luxembourg 131 473 38 106.05 63 446
3 Hong Kong 3,174 7,241 17.9 105.75 6,848
4 Italy 20,489 55,918 22.2 101.76 91 54,951
5 Iceland 104 279 21.8 96.56 289
6 Czech Republic 965 9,709 58.7 96.46 75 10,065
7 Israel 2,147 6,334 31.1 95.45 6,636
8 Spain 6,437 37,507 42.3 91.61 57 40,942
9 Norway 2,106 4,163 14.6 90.89 4,581
10 Portugal 3,075 9,341 24.9 90.38 78 10,336
11 Finland 2,846 4,700 10.6 90.06 4 5,219
12 Sweden 4,109 7,949 17.9 88.89 68 8,943
13 Denmark 1,931 4,785 19.9 88.72 21 5,394
14 Austria 2,293 7,095 25.3 87.88 48 8,073
15 Slovenia 162 1,739 60.8 87.09 52 1,997
18 UK 14,878 49,677 35.2 84.07 59,090
22 Germany 13,913 64,800 36 78.54 53 82,506
28 France 11,210 41,683 30 69.59 40 59,898
2!9 Korea(Rep.) 14,019 33,592 19.1 69.37 48,424
32 Japan 47,308 86,659 12.9 67.96 3 127,514
42 United States 69,209 158,722 18.1 54.3 6 292,306
69 Brazil 7368.2 46373 44.5 26.36 175923
78 China 23863 269000 62.3 21.4 1257009
*CAGR: Compound Annual Growth Rate
(Source: ITU, 2004)
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4.3 HANDSETS
In countries other than Japan, each mobile operator sells its SIM cards to customers
along with mobile phone handsets specified by the mobile handset vendors. In turn, mobile
phone handset vendors sell their handsets to mobile operators or directly to customers. The
key factors by which customers decide on a mobile company are price and brand of the
handset. Therefore mobile operators have no motivation to customize the handsets for their
original services.
In Japan mobile operators developed new services that worked on their own mobile
network and then ordered handset vendors to develop handsets that met those specifications.
This relationship between mobile operators and mobile handset vendors resulted in numerous
innovations in mobile Internet services, and this vertically integrated service became rapidly
diffused in Japan. I will discuss this process in greater detail in the next chapter.
Following Japan's success with its mobile Internet service, major mobile operators
began developing relationships with mobile handset vendors. For instance, Vodafone ordered
handsets for its service (called "Vodafone live!") from Nokia, Motorola, and other major
vendors. Although the service was based on standard technologies, it caused additional costs
to the vendors to customize their handset's software to Vodafone's specifications.
Regarding handset functions, the trend has shifted from simple to complex. With
ever-developing new innovations and technologies, mobile handsets continually evolve into
PC-like gadgets. When cameras were embedded in mobile phones, it was huge hit with
consumers around the world. A summary of the handset's functional trends is shown in Table
4-3.
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Table 4-3 Comparison of mobile handset functions
Source: Author, 2005
After 2001, shipments of mobile handsets increased exponentially (see Figure 4-2).
Customer demands in North America and Western European countries, to replace existing
handsets with new models, contributed to this growth. In addition, the market size increased
dramatically in Central and South American countries.
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Function Late 1990s Early 2000s
Network Circuit switching (Voice) Circuit switching (Voice)
Packet switching (Data)
Size Small, Light Small, Light / Large, Heavy
Sound Monophony ring tone Polyphony ring tone,
Music player
Display Monochrome, Small Color, Large
Design Conservative, Candy bar Radical, Clamshell
Messaging SMS SMS/MMS/E-mail
Internet WAP browser XHTML browser
Connection to PC Cable Cable, Blue tooth, IrDA
Additional Camera, Memory card, JAVA
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Source: Gartner, 2000-2005
Fig. 4-2 Worldwide mobile phone shipments, 1999 to 2004
For a long time, Nokia held the number one position in the mobile phone market.
However, in 2004 Nokia's market share dropped from 34.8 % to 30.7 %, because
competition became much stronger. Korean companies, specifically Samsung and LG, have
continued to increase their market share. Mobile phone vendors aim to increase sales in the
high-end segment which has a higher profit margin. To date, Japanese handset vendors have
not been successful in the world market.
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Table 4-4 Worldwide mobile phone shipments and market share
Rank Vendor 2004 2003
Shipment Market share Shipment Market share
(Millions) %) (Millions) (%)
1 Nokia 207 30.7 180 34.8
2 Motorola 104 15.4 75 14.5
3 Samsung 85 12.6 54 10.5
4 Siemens 48 7.2 44 8.4
5 LG 42 6.3 26 5.0
6 Sony Ericsson 42 6.2 27 5.1
Others 145 21.6 113 21.7
Total 674 100 520 100
Source: Gartner. 2005
4.4 INTRODUCTION OF 3G SERVICE
After several 3G license auctions in 2000, the financial status of mobile operators in
European countries became worse. This caused them to be very careful about introducing 3G
services. Moreover, 3G systems based on the W-CDMA standard were technologically
challenging, and equipment venders were struggling to develop network equipment and
handsets.
In Japan, however, NTT DoCoMo launched its 3G service, named FOMA, based on
W-CDMA technology-the first in the world-in 2001. At first the service was not
especially good because it was limited to a small service area, the handsets were large and
had a short standby time, and connections were poor. This poor perception causes the
company's market share to suffer. At the same time, NTT DoCoMo's competitor, KDDI,
47
increased its market shares by using another 3G standard, CDMA2000 IX. The problems
were gradually resolved after thousands of hours of field research and enormous
infrastructure investment. As a result, NTT DoCoMo announced that in Q1 2005, the number
of FOMA subscribers now exceeds ten million.
In 2004 the mobile operators that waited to begin 3G service because its poor quality
announced they would begin 3G service. Those companies needed differentiated products in
order to compete with the other companies in this mature market.
4.5 ALLIANCES
To survive in the competitive mobile market, some companies are entering into
alliances or groups between different countries. The objectives of an alliance are mainly cost
reduction of handsets or network equipment through mass procurements, and continuous
growth achieved through synergies in global services. I discuss four major alliances or
groups in the following sections.
A I 14.D.1
Vodafone Group is the largest mobile company in the world. It has
interests in 26 countries on five continents. In 2004, the company had approximately 151.8
million registered customers calculated. In addition, the company has partner networks in
fourteen other countries. Under its unified brand name "Vodafone," the company manages by
using economies of scale. For example, the group ordered 3G handsets with globally unified
specifications from several major mobile handset vendors. The group also provides the same
services in different countries, including "Vodafone live!," a comprehensive service that
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offers messaging, browsing, games and music, and Eurocall-a single-rate roaming service
within European countries.
4.5.2 ae ,
FreeMove consists of four large mobile operators: Orange SA,
Telef6nica M6viles, TIM, and T-Mobile. The alliance claims nearly 170 million customers
in 21 European territories, and 230 million customers worldwide. The alliance aims to
develop synergies in business solutions, including a fixed-price roaming package for
BlackBerry e-mail users, and roaming service and joint handset procurement from Siemens
and Motorola.
4.5.3 i starmap
nobite alliance
The Starmap Mobile Alliance is a union of eleven mobile
operators: Amena (Spain), Eurotel (Czech Republic), 02 (Germany, the UK and Ireland),
One (Austria), Pannon GSM (Hungary), SONOFON (Denmark), Sunrise (Switzerland),
Telenor Mobil (Norway) and Wind (Italy), with a subscriber base of more than 53 million.
The alliance aims to develop seamless GPRS and MMS roaming services across its
network. Members cooperate on the definition and development of 3G handsets and have
entered into a strategic partnership with Sony Ericsson.
4.5.4
NTT DoCoMo is developing international i-mode alliance that includes E-
Plus Mobilfunk GmbH & Co. KG (Germany), KPN Mobile N.V. (Netherlands), Far EasTone
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Telecommunications (Taiwan), BASE N.V./S.A (Belgium), Bouygues Telecom S.A.
(France), Telefonica Moviles Espana (Spain), Wind Telecomunicazioni SpA (Italy),
COSMOTE Mobile Telecommunications S.A (Greece), Telstra Corporation Limited
(Australia), Cellcom (Israel), mmO2 (UK, Ireland and Germany) and MTS (Russia).
Through these and other partnerships, NTT DoCoMo is sharing its technology and
know-how and building relationships that support content diversity for the maximum benefit
of subscribers.
4.5.5 OMTP Group
The Open Mobile Terminal Platform group (OMTP) was established by mmO2, NTT
DoCoMo, Orange, SMART Communications, Telef6nica M6viles, TIM (Telecom Italia
Mobile), T-Mobile, and Vodafone in June 2004.
OMTP Group identifies common mobile operator requirements with the aim of
establishing an open framework for mobile device manufacturers and associated software
and hardware suppliers to develop open mobile terminal platform-compliant products.
OMTP Group aims to use existing standards and to further encourage the development of
standards by presenting OMTP requirements.
4.6 SUMMARY
In this chapter I described several trends in the mobile industry beginning in the late
1990s to the early 2000s.
Two innovations had a major impact on the decade: mobile internet service and 3G
service. Mobile internet service was an incremental innovation based on existing
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technologies, and it was accepted by customers immediately. On the other hand, 3G service
was a disruptive innovation based on new technologies standardized by ITU, and it was
introduced as a result of demands by the mobile operators themselves. Therefore customers
were much slower in accepting it. Figure 4-2 shows that process.
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Fig. 4-2 S-curve of the mobile industry
In terms of markets, Japan has a low penetration rate compared to Western European
countries. However, prepaid service is less desirable if one considers long-term profitability.
The relationships between mobile operators and mobile handset vendors are changing
to alliances similar to those in Japan. However, to date those alliances have not produced
great results.
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Chapter 5
Structure of the Mobile Industry in Japan
In this chapter I describe the structure of the mobile industry in Japan by using
several analytical frameworks. First I will analyze the profitability of the industry by using
Michel Porter's Five Forces Model. Then I will analyze the dynamics of the current mobile
industry in Japan. Finally, three threats against incumbents are mentioned, and a system
dynamics model is modified by those threats.
5.1 PORTER'S FIVE FORCES MODEL
In Japan's mobile industry, mobile operators have enjoyed a profitable market since
they began their businesses, although there have been many M&As and recessions. I have
analyzed the current mobile industry in Japan to determine why it has been so profitable
using Porter's Five Forces, as follows.
(1) Rivalry among competitors: Medium
In 2004, there were four companies-NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, Vodafone and Tu-ka-
in the mobile industry in Japan. Except for NTT DoCoMo, the other three companies were
formed by local mobile operators and their owners have changed (see Figure 5-1).
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Tu-KaCellular
KDDI group
NISSAN |Tu-Ka Phone I i i (Kyocera + TOYOTA)
group e 1999
Digital Tu-Ka , 
I .. . .' 2003 Vodafone group
Japan Railway Digital Ph-Phon Vodafone
(JR) group I I1
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 5-1 Transition in mobile operators
In terms of market share, NTT DoCoMo holds more than 50%, followed by KDDI
with 20%, and Vodafone with slightly less than KDDI. Tu-Ka has a small portion compared
to the other three companies. These companies compete with each other on the basis of
attractive handsets with various features, prices, and new services. As a result, market share
has generally remained similar since the four companies were formed in 2000, as Figure 5-2
shows.
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Fig. 5-2 Market share of the mobile market in Japan
In the late 1990s, severe competition between the companies caused a price war. As
Figure 5-3 shows, in 2000 the charge for a three-minute call dropped to ¥70, about one-
quarter of the charge per call of ten years earlier. Moreover, retail shops received a subsidy as
a sales incentive, so they decreased the price of handsets, some as low as zero yen. This price
war simply accelerated expansion of the number of subscribers.
Since 2000, however, competition shifted from price to various offerings of mobile
internet services. Each company provided discount plans including a carryover of the
communication allowance to subsequent months; a discount on charges between families;
and a flat rate for mobile internet services in spite of the decreased call charge. This price
discount strategy and subsidy effectively decreased the companies' profit in the mature
market in which growth in the number of subscribers was slowing down.
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Fig. 5-3 Price reduction in NTT DoCoMo
(2) Entry barriers - High
The mobile communication business in Japan is restricted by the government because
spectrum resources are limited. Table 5-1 shows the current allocation of spectrum for
mobile operators. There is no availability for new entrants seeking bandwidth for a new
service.
Table 5-1 Allocation of spectrum
800MHz 1.5GHz 2GHz
NTT DoCoMo 29MHz x 2 5.5MHz x 2 15MHz x 2
KDDI (au) 15MHzx2 1MHz x 2
Vodafone 11.5MHz x 2 1MHzx 2
Tu-Ka 10MHz x 2
Source: MIC, 2004.
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Infrastructure cost is also an important issue for new entrants. Service that works
nationwide is very attractive to customers, but to achieve such coverage requires a huge
investment. For example, NTT DoCoMo invested $10 billion over three years to build its
nationwide 3G network. Although a national roaming service or MVNO (Mobile Virtual
Network Operator) among incumbents would decrease costs, arranging a contract between
incumbent service providers would be very difficult.
The number of channels is a critical factor. The incumbents have broad networks for
selling their handsets, promoting new services, and providing aftersale service. For example,
NTT DoCoMo has 144 shops offering storefront service to customers in Tokyo.
(3) Power of Suppliers - Low
As described in Chapter 4, in Japan's mobile industry all handsets are sold under each
mobile compamy's brand. On the other hand, network equipment vendors can sell their
products to all mobile operators because their products' interfaces are standardized. However,
NTT DoCoMo has R&D departments that have developed new technologies for next-
generation standards, and these are usually developed based on feedback from its vendors. In
addition, the company is able to add new functions to its network equipment unilaterally. The
relationship between mobile operators and their vendors is shown in Table 5-2.
Each mobile company provides their own unique services by using network
equipment and handsets that have been customized for those services. The relationship
between mobile operators and their handset vendors has worked well for the Japanese mobile
market, so handset vendors maintain good relations with the mobile operators.
Table 5-2 Handsets and network equipment vendors
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Handset vendors Network equipments vendors
NTT DoCoMo NEC, Fujitsu, Panasonic, Mitsubishi, NEC, Fujitsu, Panasonic, Ericsson,
Sony-Ericsson, Sharp Lucent
KDDI Kyocera, Sanyo, Casio, Toshiba, Motorola, Hitachi, Fujitsu, Samsung
Hitachi, Sony-Ericsson
Vodafone NEC, Hitachi, Sharp, Sony-Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia, NEC
Nokia, Motorola, Toshiba, Sanyo,
Mitsubishi
Tu-Ka Kyocera, Toshiba, Sanyo NEC, Motorola
Source: Each mobile operator's website, 2005
(4) Power of Buyers - Medium
Although the mobile operators are providing new handsets and new services, the
functions being offered are actually overshooting customer demands. Moreover, in terms of
service quality, the mobile operators have almost completed building their networks.
Therefore it is very difficult for customers to determine much difference between the
companies' products and services, so customers tend to be attracted by the retail price of the
handset.
For customers who have already bought a handset, however, it is very difficult to
switch to another mobile company since their phone number will also have to change.
Although the cost to buy a new handset from another company is not that expensive because
of the subsidy, the bigger hassle for customers is having to inform everyone in their address
book about their new phone number. That tends to reinforce the bond of customers with their
present mobile service provider.
(5) Availability of Substitutes - Low
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There are two possible substitutes for mobile service in Japan: the Personal Handy
phone System (PHS) and wireless LAN. However, these services do not represent a threat to
mobile service providers for the following reasons:
> PHS started in 1995 as a complement to mobile phones that functioned only in a small
area, with low mobility and a low price. Three companies provided PHS service: NTT
Personal from NTT, DDI Pocket from DDI, and Astel from the power companies.
However, with the price war in the mobile market, their price advantage weakened and
the total number of customers has declined since 1997. Some companies shifted their
strategy from voice service to data service, while others offered a flat rate service for data.
Although this strategy brought back some subscribers temporarily, the general trend is
still a declining in the number, and companies in Astel Group have been liquidated one
after another.
) Wireless LAN has penetrated strongly in Japan, following the equally strong penetration
of PCs equipped with wireless LAN and broadband internet connections like DSL.
IEEE802. 1 b, .1 a, and .1 g are the major standards in use. IEEE802.1 lb can provide
data transmission speeds up to 11 Mbit/sec while .11 a and .11 g provide transmission
speeds up to 54 Mbit/sec. Wireless LAN also offers easy wireless access to the internet in
offices and homes. However, wireless LAN services in public spaces, called "hotspots,"
have not yet become successful because of the small number of people who use a PC
outside their office or home compared to the U.S., as well as the relatively high price, and
limited service area. Most Japanese people prefer to use their mobile phone for e-mail,
which is quick and does not require the use of a PC.
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My analysis of the mobile industry in Japan is summarized in Figure 5-4, which
shows that each of the forces works to the advantage of the incumbents mobile service
providers. In particular, the high entry barrier and low availability of substitutes keeps
incumbents profitable with little outside threat. In addition, the relationships between mobile
operators and vendors, and the bond caused by loyalty to a user's phone number, also play an
important role in keeping the industry profitable.
High entry barriers
* Regulated spectrum
* High initial cost
* Many channels
New Entrants
Industry
Competitors
Intensity of Rivalry
A
Suppliers
Low Power of Suppliers
* Good relationship between mobile
operators and vendors
* Technology led by mobile
operators
Medium Rivalry among Competitors
* Four competitors
* Rapidly growth
* Moderate price war
* Stable market share
Buyers
Medium Power of Buyers
* Bonding by phone number
* Price sensitive
Substitutes
Low Availability of Substitutes
· PHS, WLAN
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 5-4 Porter's Five Forces applied the mobile industry in Japan
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5.2 GROWTH DYNAMICS OF THE MOBILE INDUSTRY IN JAPAN
In this section, I will analyze the mobile phone industry in Japan using a system
dynamics model. The analysis identifies the source of growth in the industry.
First, I created and analyzed a profit dynamics model which shows how mobile
operators earn profit. Second, I created a customer growth dynamics model which shows
what variables influence customers to subscribe to a mobile company's service. Then I focus
on two variables-product functionality and service functionality-which play important
roles in the customer growth dynamics model. Those two variables are involved in each
dynamics model. In the system dynamics model analysis, some specific growth factors for
the current industry are shown.
5.2.1 Profit Dynamics Model
Profit dynamics is the process by which mobile operators make money. There are
three kinds of revenue from operations: (1) revenue from monthly charges, (2) revenue from
communication charges, and (3) revenue from handset sales.
Revenue from monthly charges includes the basic charge for voice communication
and data transmission, minus some communication allowances, plus a service charge for
extra services such as voice mail and call waiting. Since the monthly charge has to be paid
even if a subscriber does not use the service in that month, the company can count on this
revenue according to the number of subscribers that will be paying every month.
On the other hand, revenue from communication charges is dependent on how much
the subscribers use their services in a month. For this revenue evaluation, ARPU (Average
Revenue Per User) and MOU (Minutes Of Usage) are used. If the communication charge is
60
reduced, companies have to somehow encourage subscribers to use their services more in
order to maintain ARPU.
Revenuefrom handsets occurs when potential customers buy the company's handset
at the time they enter into a new contract or when customers who are already subscribers
replace an old handset with a new one. However, mobile operators pay retail shops a subsidy
to sell handsets, as a way to increase the number of new customers who will then provide
added revenue from monthly charges or increased revenue from handsets.
Each company's profit is calculated by the difference between these three kinds of
revenue, as well as operating costs and investment (see Figure 5-5).
Revenue from sales v l
of handsets + Revenue -- EBITDA
\+ S~ ~ + Operation /
+ + cost
Subsidy----- cost Investment
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 5-5 Profit dynamics model of the mobile industry
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5.2.2 Customer Growth Dynamics
The key factors for changing a potential customer to a subscriber are attractiveness
and awareness. Increased revenue enables the company to implement various strategies that
reinforce the company's attractiveness as well as awareness.
There are five major factors that affect attractiveness:
1. Communication Charge (Monthly fee, price of making a telephone call),
2. Service Quality (coverage, quality of the network, mobility etc),
3. Product price (price of mobile phone),
4. Product functionality (functionality of mobile phone such as Camera, Movie etc and also
including the design of mobile phone) and
5. Service functionality (On-line shopping, email, music, movie etc).
Communication charge directly affects ARPU, therefore companies want to avoid
price wars. Instead companies promote discount plans including reasonable communication
allowances and flat rate plans for mobile internet services.
Regarding service quality, each company continually invests in infrastructures, such
as antennas, base stations, and switches, for the purpose of improving service quality by
offering greater opportunities to utilize the network company's mobile phone service.
As described earlier, subsidy affects product price at retail shops, and price is very
attractive to customers. Therefore the companies cannot stop or reduce subsidies even if such
subsidies reduce their profit.
Product functionality and service functionality have their own system dynamics
model. In it, less Attractiveness causes Chum which decreases ARPU. In addition, a limited
number of Potential Customers causes saturation of Subscriber Growth Rate. The purpose of
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Advertisement is primarily to enhance Awareness. Effective Advertisement also enables
customers to differentiate the company from its competitors through brand image. Word of
Mouth plays an important role, making a reinforcing loop of Awareness.
Advertisementene
+Awareness
Product growth rate
functionality
Service + Attractivenesfunctionality -'+ +
Service Products Communication
quality Price charge
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 5-6 Customer growth dynamics model of the mobile industry
5.2.3 Product Functionality Dynamics
Product Functionality is improved by R&D, which can be divided into two parts: the
mobile operator's own R&D, and joint R&D between a mobile operator and the mobile
phone manufacturers.
A mobile operator's own R&D focuses mainly on incremental or disruptive
innovations of service (both quality and functionality) and can be used to enhance network
efficiency which leads to a competitive communication charge. On the other hand, most
mobile operators let OEM manufacturers produce mobile phones through joint R&D
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activities; therefore the mobile phone operators' R&D activities focus mainly on improving
the functionality of their mobile phone.
Each mobile operator commits to the number of mobile handsets it will buy from the
OEM manufacturer. Therefore Commitment Volume is source of dynamics that affects
Vendor's Motivation, Parts Price and Development Cost Per Handset. As a result, Product
Functionality is improved under a limited budget which contributes to Subscriber Growth
Rate. In addition Product Wholesale Price is reduced by scale economies, and reduced
Operation Cost results in increased profit.
rate
EBITDA
ttion cost
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 5-7 Product Functionality dynamics model of the mobile industry
5.2.4 Service Functionality Dynamics
Service Functionality is mainly enriched by the amount of contents including news,
games, music, pictures, movies, and so on. Contents are divided into two categories: official
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contents and unofficial contents. Official contents are accepted by the mobile operators; they
are listed portal sites and can use a billing system provided by the mobile operators. Though
unofficial contents cannot be restricted by the mobile operators, they have to use their own
billing system if they want to be paid for subscribers who use their contents.
Both contents providers are motivated by Number of Subscribers because the more
subscribers, the more profit they can expect to earn. Increasing of Number of Contents
improves Service Functionality and Attractiveness. This process creates a reinforcing loop of
service quality. In addition, Attractiveness increases MOU which contributes to increased
revenue. Mobile operators are adding new function in their network and handsets to
encourage this reinforcing loop.
MOU + Service
'"-_ functionality
R /D 3rd Party 
~~R&D 1Contents
Contents providers'
motivation
Contents
growth rate
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 5-8 Service Functionality system dynamic model of
5.2.5 System Dynamics Model of the Current Mobile Industry in Japan
By combining the four prior system dynamics models, I created Figure 5-9 which
shows how each individual model relates to the whole model.
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mobile industry
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+ Awareness
Word of
\'Y, A Mouth
handsets
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 5-9 System dynamics model of the current mobile industry in Japan
Product functionality dynamics and service functionality dynamics are connected to
profit dynamics by attractiveness. Those two dynamics create reinforcing loops triggered by
the number of subscribers. On the other hand, an increase of MOU is the result of an
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increase of service functionality and decrease of operation cost by increase of commitment
volume contribute to increase of profit.
5.3 STRATEGIES OF KEY PLAYERS
Now I can analyze the strategies being pursued by mobile operators based on five
factors which affect attractiveness: Product functionality, Product price, Communication
charge, Service functionality, and Service Quality.
5.3.1 Product Functionality
Product function is the most sensitive factor for consumers. Highly functional
handsets attract consumers. NTT DoCoMo has led product functionality in the industry with
its JAVA and Flash functions. However, KDDI and Vodafone are beginning to catch up with
DoCoMo's functions. Moreover, KDDI and Vodafone are also providing their own original
functions which are attractive to consumers, for example, novel handsets designed by au
design project, a music player function, and a TV function. Recently, however, the functions
have tended to overshoot customer demand and have not contributed to differentiating
between mobile operators.
Tu-Ka's strategy is different from the other mobile operators. Tu-Ka keeps its
handsets simple. Its model "Tu-Ka S" has no display, no camera, and features large buttons.
The handset appeals to customers who are less comfortable with mobile phone, such as
senior citizens. The response curve for Product Functionality is shown in Figure 5-10.
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Fig. 5-10 Effect of Product Functionality on Attractiveness
5.3.2 Product Price
Product price affects consumers who buy a handset in a retail shop. However, that
sensitivity is lower than Product Functionality. In terms of product price, NTT DoCoMo has
kept its price higher than its competitors because of its well-known strong brand, even when
competitors' handsets are sold for one yen because of high subsidies from those companies.
To compete with its competitors' prices, NTT DoCoMo has developed a low-end handset
series called the 700 series, which uses an existing platform and has fewer functions.
Vodafone has the advantage of wholesale prices for 3G handsets by using a
worldwide Vodafone group procurement strategy. However, global specifications are
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difficult to customize for domestic demand, therefore to date Vodafone is struggling to sell
those handsets.
For all mobile operators, subsidies are very important for getting new customers,
although too much subsidy results in decreasing profit. Therefore the effort to decrease
wholesale price is necessary for financial growth. The response curve of product price is
shown in Figure 5-11.
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Product Price
Reference Product Price
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 5-11 Effect of Product Price on Attractiveness
5.3.3 Communication Charges
Each company's communication charges are not that different, and each company
also offers various discount plans. Therefore it is difficult for consumers to determine which
company is the least expensive. Among the companies, KDDI aggressively advertises its
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discount plan, including a student discount named Gaku-wari and a flat rate plan for mobile
Internet service, the first in Japan. Tu-Ka provides a discount plan based on its simple
strategy. The response curve for Communication Charges is shown in Figure 5-12.
I u-Ka
DoCoMo, KDDI and Vodafone
Communication charge
Reference Communication charge
Source: Author, 2005
Fig. 5-12 Effect of Communication Charge on Attractiveness
A comparison of communication charges between the mobile operators is difficult to
do because there are many plans based on usage. Therefore the three companies are located
in the same position on the curve.
5.3.4 Service Functionality
Service functionality affects not only attractiveness but also the amount of data
transactions which in turn increases revenue. NTT DoCoMo has led the industry with its
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mobile internet service called i-mode. However, these days service functionality has been
commoditized because many third-party content providers offer the same contents to all
companies. In this circumstance, the mobile operators have moved forward with their
original strategies.
NTT DoCoMo promotes a shift from 2G to 3G. In addition by embedding its
contactless IC card named FeliCa, the company aims to expand its market.
KDDI's strategy is based on its CDMA2000 EV-DO network. The company
promotes a rich contents download service that includes music and movies. In addition,
KDDI plans to converge its regular services, mobile services, and fixed services.
Vodafone's strategy is characterized by globalization. The company tries to exploit
Vodafone Group's scale economies. Vodafone Live! is its typical service based on
standardized technologies in use in the Vodafone Group. In addition the company promotes
global roaming service on their W-CDMA/GSM dual-function handsets. Compared to the
former two companies, Vodafone is late in making the transition from 2G to 3G.
Tu-Ka's strategy has been to keep its services simple, and the company aims to
identify and fill niche segments.
The response curve for Service Functionality is shown in Figure 5-13.
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Fig. 5-13 Effect of Service Functionality on Attractiveness
5.3.5 Service Quality
In the early stages, Service Quality included service area, capacity, and voice quality
all of which were important to consumers. However, all companies have now built their
infrastructure and have attained sufficient good quality. Therefore Service Quality is not as
important for consumers when they consider choosing a company, although all the
companies still invest in service quality, including capacity and service area. The response
curve of service quality is shown in Figure 5-14.
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Fig. 5-14 Effect of Service Quality on Attractiveness
5.4 THREAT
In this section, I will discuss threats that may dramatically change the dynamics of the
mobile industry. These are mobile number portability, flat rate, new entrants, and
globalization. Each threat has the potential to change the dynamics mentioned in the earlier
sections.
5.4.1 Mobile Number Portability
Mobile number portability (MNP) is a relatively new system that allows consumers to
change their mobile company without giving up their current phone number. In May 2004,
Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) announced guidelines
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concerning the introduction of MNP. The guidelines mandate that the mobile operators must
introduce MNP for their 2G and 3G service by early 2006. According to a report by Nomura
Research Institute, MNP will accelerate chum between mobile operators (see Figure 5-15).
This will cause strong competition based on price and services, although it will also depend
on how convenient customers find the system. A price war may exhaust the mobile operators,
and customers' (buyers') power will be enhanced because of low switching costs.
Source: Nomura Research Institute, 2004
Fig. 5-15 Expectations of churn among mobile operators
On the other hand activation of a mature mobile market is expected with the onset of
innovative services. For example, Korea gradually began to introduce MNP in January 2004,
and the increased marketing costs had a bad effect on most Korean mobile operators.
However, the leading company, SKT, maintained its dominant position by offering attractive
handsets and new services including fixed mobile convergence (FMC). In addition,
subscriber growth rate increased in the first half of 2004, although the final effect of MNP
will need to be determined after introduction is complete.
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5.4.2 Flat Rate
In Japan, flat rate plans for data communication services were begun by PHS
company, DDI Pocket in 2001, and leveraged growth of PHS subscribers subsequently
declined. NTT I)oCoMo followed with its own flat rate plan for its PHS service in 2003. The
service is enabled by advanced radio access control protocol and lower network costs using
IPI' technology.
Following PHS, most mobile operators began to offer flat rate service, although their
service applied only to use of their own mobile internet services and did not include data
transmission via PC because of higher traffic.
KDDI began its flat rate plan, named EZ-flat in 2003. The company aggressively
promoted its flat rate plan and established its brand image as a broadband mobile service
provider. NTT DoCoMo and Vodafone followed with their own flat rate plans in 2004.
Fit-frote
charoes
4,200 (4,410 . . .
including tax) ( t
2,000 (2,100
including tax) _
40,C00 84,000 P kets used)
Up to 40.00 packets
¥2,000 (¥2,100 including tax)
40,000 to 84,000 packets
¥0.05 /packet
(¥0.0525 including tax)
C 84,000 packets or more
4,200 (4,410 including tax)
Source: KDDI website, 2005
Fig. 5-16 Flat rate plan by KDDI
On the other hand, WILLCOM changed from DDI pocket and announced that the
company will begin flat rate service for voice communication within its own network.
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Although a flat rate plan is attractive for heavy users, the plan stops revenue from
communication charges based on MOU. Therefore mobile operators have to consider how to
make money if they choose to offer a flat rate plan.
5.4.3 New Entrants
Since MIC announced it would reorganize bandwidth frequency allocations in 2003,
new entrants from other industries have indicated they would enter the mobile industry by
using state-of-art technologies (see Table 5-3). They can be categorized by their technology.
Softbank and E-access plan to use W-CDMA and CDMA2000, technology that has
been already commercialized. IPmobile plans to use TD-CDMA which has not been
commercialized. The technology needs to be evaluated for performance, although it is based
on the IMT-2000 standard. WiMAX is the broadband wireless network based on the IEEE
802.16 standard. The network functions on a fixed-line connection similar to DSL. In 2005,
mobile service IEEE 802.16e will be standardized. The problem is that frequency band for
WiMAX has not been approved for use so far.
Although each company has technical and political issues, it is obvious that new
entrants will offer their services at very low prices. Therefore incumbents will have to
carefully monitor this movement.
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Table 5-3 Services planned by new entrants
Company Frequency
(Main industry) System band Services Launch date
Softbank W-CDMA or 800MHz Nationwide service 2007
(Fixed broadband) CDMA2000
W-CDMA 1.7GHz Start from large cities 2006
E-access (HSDPA) Cheap voice service
(Fixed broadband) Flat rate plan for data service
MVNO
IPmobile TD-CDMA 2GHz unknown unknown
(Venture)
Heisei denden WiMAX unknown unknown 2005
(Fixed telephone) (Field test)
Yozan WiMAX 4.95GHz Metropolitan area Dec. 2005
(PHS) Flat rate plan for all services
Source: various company websites, 2005)
5.4.3 Globalization
As 3G service has become a global standard, the mobile industry in Japan has also
advanced. There are no longer mobile communications boundaries between countries, and
handset vendors and network equipment vendors can sell their products worldwide. However,
Japanese vendors have not succeeded in entering other foreign countries because of weak
brand perception among consumers. At the same time, foreign vendors have also struggled to
sell their products to Japanese mobile operators because Japanese companies require that the
products be customized for use in Japan. Japanese vendors like NEC and Panasonic may
decide to shift their resources from Japan's limited market the larger global market. That will
weaken the relationships between mobile operators and vendors. As a result, Japanese mobile
operators will lose their current source of growth.
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5.6 SUMMARY
In this chapter, I analyzed the sources of profitability in Japan's mobile market using
Porter's Five Forces model. Then I identified and analyzed the sources of market growth by
using system dynamics models. Profitability comes from high entry barriers, low availability
of substitutes, strong relationships between mobile operators and vendors, and customer
bonding to their phone number.
On the other hand, growth can also come from a revenue reinforcing loop generated
by product functionality, product price, service functionality, communication charge, and
service quality. Those factors play key roles in the system dynamics model of the mobile
industry in Japan, which is leveraged by subsidies to retail shops and by R&D efforts.
The mobile operators have enjoyed enormous profit when the market was growing
rapidly. However, the market penetration rate has now reached 66.6% of the population,
which I believe may be among the highest penetration rates for an electronic appliance.
Companies are working hard to acquire more customers from among those in the Late
Majority and Laggard segments. In addition, services have become commoditized because
there is little or no differentiation and because of low prices caused by price wars. These
phenomena are the hallmarks of a mature market.
These sources will be affected by threats in the near future such as mobile number
portability, flat rate service options, new entrants, and globalization. As mobile number
portability becomes more common, it will weaken the bond that currently keeps consumers
reasonably loyal to one mobile company because they do not wish to change their phone
number. Flat rate service will change the business model earnings for communication
charges per use. New entrants will cause severe price wars as new technologies and business
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modes become widely available. Finally, globalization will cause vendors to shift their
resources from the Japanese mobile operators to worldwide markets.
In the next chapter I will describe what NTT DoCoMo can do to enhance its future
growth under these circumstances, particularly through the use of the growth models first
described in Chapter Two.
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Chapter 6
Applying the Frameworks to NTT DoCoMo
In this chapter, I describe suggestions for what NTT DoCoMo can do to further its
growth by combining the three frameworks mentioned in Chapter Two with the information
discussed in Chapters Four and Five. I also discuss several factors that could hinder or
prevent NTT DoCoMo from applying these solutions.
6.1 INNOVATIVE ORGANIZATION
As I described in Chapter Three, innovations that result in further growth are an
outgrowth of an innovative organization. From the structure shown in Figure 3-2, I have
chosen several important factors that apply to NTT DoCoMo.
6.1.1 Sources of New Ideas
One of the most important sources of new business ideas is a company's hidden
assets, which are difficult for new entrants to imitate. In the previous chapter, I identified the
NTT DoCoMo's hidden assets as the following: number of subscribers, relationships with
Japanese vendors and contents providers, channels, networking know-how through
construction and operation of 2G and 3G systems, and brand. When the company identifies
new businesses, it should take every opportunity capitalizes on these hidden assets.
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Feedback from failure often provides useful information, and NTT DoCoMo has
struggled with many failed businesses. For example, in 2001, the company started a music
distribution service called "M-Stage Music," which used the PHS system. However, the
service never attracted sufficient customers because it was too expensive and the service
was terminated in 2004. However, music distribution services such as Apple's iTunes have
become extremely popular through the Internet. If NTT DoCoMo makes the decision to
reenter this market and offer a similar type of service, the company must learn from its past
experiences.
I believe NTT DoCoMo can also learn from other leading business users. Therefore if
the company aims to leverage its business segment, it needs to consider customizing or
developing products by considering the example and experiences of the leading business
users.
(a) Finding Resources Outside
Resources inside NTT DoCoMo are limited. Therefore the company must look for
further growth ideas from sources outside the company. Venture companies and universities,
both in Japan and other countries, are potential resources. NTT DoCoMo has maintained
good relations with Japanese universities; it has also invested in venture capitalists, such as
Gobi Partners and their digital media venture companies in China, as well as Mobile Internet
Capital, Inc. in 1999. However, those investments have not been especially successful so far.
NTT DoCoMo needs to find innovative businesses or technologies by using its own venture
capital as well as networking with professors in foreign universities.
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(b) Finding Entrepreneurs Outside
Business ideas that begin as in-house ventures often have characteristics like a small
startup company. The leaders of these types of businesses have to be entrepreneurs capable
of designing a good business model, finding resources, and then growing the company. In
established companies like NTT DoCoMo, however, such an entrepreneur is usually hard to
find. One way to find such people is from sources outside the company. Once the business is
capable of expanding into a full-fledged business, the organization can be shifted from an
entrepreneurial organization to a traditional organization.
(c) Encouraging In-House Ventures
In 2001, NTT DoCoMo began a program to encourage in-house ventures. Out of that
program, three companies have been established so far:
* Tametan: a portal business company specializing in information for employees
* Double-Square: a planning company that provides information for working women
* Allucher: a marketing company focused on young working women and the mobile
business
NTT I)oCoMo has an established a program that offers incentives for people who
create new business ideas, and they are encouraged to patent their ideas.
6.1.2 Hidden Liabilities
Based on my thesis research into NTT DoCoMo and my personal experience, I
discovered a dilemma caused by some of the company's hidden liabilities: a bureaucratic
atmosphere, an organization that is too large, long-tenure employees, and established brand. I
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found that these liabilities tend to make employees conservative, sometimes even arrogant. A
top-down management system or a new system for evaluating performance based on
innovative results will be required in order to encourage employees to become more
innovative.
6.2 PLATFORM LEADERSHIP
Platform leadership is very important for bonding customers and suppliers with NTT
DoCoMo, especially after the introduction of MNP and globalization. I would like to suggest
two ways for NTT DoCoMo to retain its current platform leadership and to create new
platform leadership.
6.2.1 Keep current platform leadership
Currently, NTT DoCoMo manages its platform leadership by offering the i-mode
platform based on Internet technologies. In the beginning, the i-mode platform included only
markup languages based on cHTML. However, as the market has grown, other functions
have been added, such as Java customized for i-mode and FLASH developed by Macromedia.
Moreover, these functions are continually updated to enhance the functions that are offered.
NTT DoCoMo has encouraged the development of new contents and services to major
content provider by offering new functions as the platform leader.
In the near future, price wars will occur among new entrants. However, this will result in
communication charges at low prices for customers. NTT DoCoMo needs to defend its profit
by preparing efficient networks and differentiated services. The company's current platform
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leadership, which encourages the development of new contents, will be a strong advantage
against new entrants.
I expect that in the near future mobile handsets will offer a high-performance
platform, something similar to current video game machines or personal computers, and
mobile network will provide broadband capability at a fixed cost like DSL or LAN. Before
these changes take place, NTT DoCoMo must do everything possible to maintain its platform
leadership position by controlling both vendors and content providers, so that when the
changes do occur, NTT DoCoMo is in position to take advantage of the new markets.
However, ongoing expansion of the current platform must be done carefully. Applications
that use an expanded platform may destroy current business models and network capacity
based on limited traffic.
In addition, when 3G service becomes diffused around the world, NTT DoCoMo,
based on its current i-mode alliance, should expand its platform leadership globally by joint
procurement of 3G handsets.
6.2.2 Creating new platform leadership
For further growth, NTT DoCoMo needs to consider creating new areas, addition to
i-mode in which it can assume platform leadership. The company is currently promoting
i-mode FeliCa, the service that uses contactless IC technology developed by SONY. NTT
DoCoMo founded FeliCa networks with SONY, developing and licensing the FeliCa
technology, and it began to embed FeliCa chip in its i-mode handsets in 2004. The service
began with an "electronic wallet" named Edy, provided by bitwallet, Inc. and has now
expanded to membership cards, banks, and transportation.
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The other major mobile companies, KDDI and Vodafone, announced they too would
apply the FeliCa technology for their handsets as well. Therefore, NTT DoCoMo must
continue to be the platform leader based on the mobile FeliCa platform.
6.3 CONCENTRATED INVESTING IN PROSPECTIVE BUSINESSES
NTT I)oCoMo's current core business remains profitable, so now is not the time to
make dramatic changes to the business. However, the company must begin now to prepare
for the future.
One of the first steps the company should take is to reorganize its current businesses.
At present, NTT DoCoMo has five main service areas: mobile phone services, PHS services,
a pager service named Quickcast, a hotspot service by WiFi named Mzone, and international
services. Its mobile phone services include 2G (PDC), 3G (FOMA) and packet data
communication services (i-mode). In these areas, the company announced it would withdraw
from the unprofitable pager services in 2004 and from PHS services in 2005.
In addition, a long-term vision is needed-although short-term plans should be
flexible enough to stay current with a variety of mobile trends. In 1999, NTT DoCoMo set its
future vision for 2010. Now is the time to evaluate the company's progress toward this vision.
Technologies, partners, and management talent should be included in the long-term plan
toward fulfilling the new vision.
As part of its long-term vision, diversification from current business should also be
considered. One recommendation is a system solution for companies by using fixed mobile
convergence (FMC) service. In a saturated consumer market, the company should target
business areas by providing handsets for businesses combined with management or
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marketing systems. I believe such services should be a combination of mobile and WiFi, so
they become widely diffused and less costly for customers. By using a mobile phone as an IP
phone through WiFi in both homes and offices, customers can reduce their communication
costs. Despite the fact that this may result in decreased revenues for mobile companies, I
believe it is necessary to pursue a strategy in order to compete with new entrants in the
business segment.
Another recommendation is that NTT DoCoMo should become a global company by
offering its service and products throughout the world. For instance, I suggest that NTT
DoCoMo could become a platform leader by producing a standard model for 4G handsets by
developing own LSI and OS, or network equipment for 4G. To increase business, NTT
DoCoMo should enter into alliance with local companies, expand its branding efforts, and
expand its marketing and business channels in foreign countries.
Although consideration is being given to entering the money transaction business,
such as credit card or banking, by using handsets embedded with FeliCa, NTT DoCoMo
should develop a strategy that considers relationships with incumbents as complementors in
the current platform.
6.3 SUMMARY
In this chapter, I discussed NTT DoCoMo's useful hidden assets which can be
expanded on to encourage new businesses through the company's in-house venture program,
through an incentive program for patents, and through investment into VCs.
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On the other hand, the company's hidden liabilities have resulted in the need for an
entrepreneur who can resolve the bureaucratic structure and reduce its large size, and resolve
issues involving long-tenure employees.
Regarding platform leadership, NTT DoCoMo has so far managed its i-mode
platform well by establishing and maintaining good relations with content providers and
handset vendors. However, if the company wishes to continue growing, it must identify and
develop another platform for FeliCa.
To date, NTT DoCoMo's profit comes mainly from its mobile phone service, and it is
not likely that this structure will change in the future. However, the twin threats of new
entrants and a flat rate charge for service will require additional business areas into which the
company can expand its business.
As part of the company's future vision, I mentioned it must consider withdrawing
from unprofitable businesses, leveraging its business segment, and producing hardware in
order to create new business for the future
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Chapter 7
Conclusion:
Keys for Growth in Japan's Mature Mobile Market
In Chapters Two and Three, I organized frameworks that can be used by a company
to produce further growth in a mature market by using traditional growth models. I also
presented my findings based on cases of successful, growing companies. The frameworks
are: innovative organization, platform leadership and concentrated investing into prospective
business. Those frameworks include key elements that should be pursued by companies that
want to grow in a mature market.
In Chapter four, I analyzed the trend of the mobile industry. Using statistical data, I
showed that the mobile market is still growing, especially in the countries like China, Russia,
and Brazil. On the other hand, in Western Europe, Korea, and Japan, the growth rate is
slowing down. Compared to Japan and Korea, Western European countries have some
margin for growth because there is still a large portion of the market that does not yet use
mobile internet services, while such services have grown exponentially in Japan and Korea.
In addition, my research into mobile handset vendors and alliances between mobile
companies found that the relationship between handset vendors and mobile operators is
becoming closer, as they seek economies of scale.
In Chapter five, I analyzed the mobile industry in Japan using Michel Porter's Five
Forces model and several system dynamics models. These analyses showed that currently the
88
mobile industry in Japan is profitable, with medium rivalry, high entry barriers, low power of
suppliers, medium power of buyers, and low availability of substitutes. There are no strong
threats from incumbents so far. Moreover, a reinforcing loop of attractiveness is fueled by
subsidies for retail shops, and relationships between mobile operators and vendors and
contents providers. Taking all these factors into consideration, the mobile operators are
pursuing good strategies at this time. However, I have also identified the probability that four
threats -- mobile number portability, flat rate, new entrants, and globalization - may change
these present circumstances.
In Chapter Six, the frameworks and information were combined and applied to NTT
DoCoMo. My analysis found that the company is on the right track for further growth.
However, enhancement of its networks with universities and venture companies around the
world, and cultivation of entrepreneurial and innovative human resources, will be needed if
the company wishes to identify and grow new businesses.
In summary, the keys for growth in Japan's mature mobile market are:
> developing an innovative organization,
maintaining the company's platform leadership position; and
additional investment in further prospective businesses.
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